By Donna Schantz
Executive Director
Last year, the Council released a report titled, “Assessment of Risks and Safety Culture at Alyeska’s Valdez Marine Terminal.” This report was initiated in response to safety concerns brought to the Council by concerned current and former Alyeska employees. The main conclusion was that there currently is an unacceptable safety risk to the terminal.
The Council has been encouraged by Alyeska’s response to this report. We stand ready to support Alyeska, and state and federal regulatory agencies, in our role as an advisor.
One of the recommendations in the report was for Congress to initiate a review by the Government Accountability Office, or GAO, to determine the adequacy of the present regulatory oversight of terminal operations by federal and state agencies. The GAO reviews federal programs on behalf of Congress and provides fact-based, nonpartisan information to lawmakers and federal agencies that can be used to improve government.
The Council is pleased to report that members of Alaska’s Congressional Delegation have requested the review and a GAO review team has been formed. The GAO team has now started their review of the regulatory and safety oversight of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System, or TAPS, which includes the 800-mile pipeline and the Valdez Marine Terminal.
It is the Council’s expectation that the GAO report resulting from this review will highlight any deficiencies in state and federal oversight of the terminal so measures can be taken to address any regulatory gaps that exist. The Council has been raising concerns about the diminishment of agency oversight at the terminal since the Joint Pipeline Office, or JPO, an interagency group of state and federal regulators, was determined to no longer exist as an organizational entity in 2010. Since then, there have been budget and staffing cuts, reorganizations and redistribution of duties, high turnover, loss of institutional knowledge, and difficulty filling positions among all of the agencies involved. The Council believes the cumulative impacts of all these factors are affecting the ability of regulators to comprehensively monitor operations that are necessary to help prevent an oil spill or other incident.
In 1991, following the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the GAO reviewed the adequacy of regulatory oversight of TAPS and found that the federal and state regulatory agencies did not have a satisfactory approach for regulating TAPS. According to the GAO, “To successfully fulfill their oversight responsibilities, the five regulatory agencies [those with the main authority out of twelve agencies total] can no longer be content with relying on Alyeska to police itself. The complacency that has existed in the past must be replaced with a systematic, disciplined, coordinated approach that will ensure TAPS’ operational safety, oil spill response, and environmental protection” (GAO,1991, p. 63 ).
In 1995, the GAO conducted another review, and while overall they found that the JPO had made progress towards improving regulatory oversight, they also found that the JPO had been operating on the philosophy of reacting to problems rather than implementing proactive programs to minimize chances that problems would occur. That 1995 GAO review led to many improvements in oversight (GAO, 1995).
Unfortunately, the system that was built up after the 1995 GAO review does not exist today. A new review is important to understand the current philosophy, capabilities, and individual responsibilities of the present regulatory oversight. This understanding is important to discern what, if any, improvements need to be made to avoid a major incident and/or oil spill.
To responsibly and safely conduct resource development, constant vigilance is required. The high standards put in place following the Exxon spill, based on lessons learned, have played a major part in preventing another major spill in our region. Any diminishment of the systems in place to promote safety and prevent spills will only lead us back to being unprepared for the destruction that occurred in 1989.
The Council is working to follow up on the recommendations from our 2023 report, one of which was the GAO review. This and the other recommendations are some of the largest and most complex issues the Council has been involved in for many years. Our organization was formed to prevent the return of the complacency that led to the Exxon Valdez spill, and our work is a constant reminder that our mission and purpose are not only still relevant, but still needed just as much if not more today.
Reports referenced
- 1991 GAO Report – Trans-Alaska Pipeline: Regulators Have Not Ensured That Government Requirements Are Being Met
- 1995 GAO Report – Trans-Alaska Pipeline: Actions to Improve Safety Are Under Way
- 2023 Report sponsored by PWSRCAC: Assessment of Risks and Safety Culture at Alyeska’s Valdez Marine Terminal